Specification
A short specification for readers who want to understand the moving parts before they copy an address. Mirror rotation model, escrow, coins accepted, verification.
The mirror set
Three onion addresses published in a signed rotation post by the operator. Every mirror resolves to the same storefront. Your account, balance, orders and messages are identical on any of them. The set rotates roughly every few weeks. See the changelog for the observed dates.
Reader shape of a rotation, in ASCII:
Escrow
Every deposit runs on a 2 of 3 multisig contract. Three keys exist: one buyer, one vendor, one platform. Any two of them are enough to release the funds. The platform alone cannot move the coins. In a normal order the platform key never moves. It only signs when either the buyer or the vendor opens a dispute.
Coins accepted
Bitcoin, Litecoin and Monero. Monero is the privacy default and the recommended coin for new orders. Litecoin is used for smaller orders because confirmations arrive faster than Bitcoin. Bitcoin works for everything but leaves a public trace on the chain. See the coins page for wallet recommendations and per-coin trade-offs.
Verification, in four commands
Every rotation ships as a PGP-signed message. Verifying that signature against the operator public key proves the announcement really came from the operator. Import the key once, then every future rotation verifies against the same fingerprint. Full walkthrough on the verify page.
1. gpg --import nexus.asc # once per keyring
2. save envelope to rotation.txt # begin/end pgp signed message
3. gpg --verify rotation.txt # exit 0 = trust the address inside
4. compare onion to current set # match wins
Operator PGP key
The operator publishes the public key on the pinned Dread profile and reserves the same fingerprint across every rotation since launch. Fetch the key once, verify the fingerprint against at least two independent sources, keep it on your keyring, reuse it forever.
Do not import a key with any other fingerprint. A rotating key would be announced at least thirty days in advance under the outgoing key. Anything shorter is a phishing attempt.
Anti-DDoS queue
Login goes through a wait page that decrements a counter before the captcha renders. Default wait is 20 to 60 seconds. Shifts up under real pressure. Cheap way to raise the cost of automated credential-stuffing.
Captcha with the address baked in
The Nexus login captcha carries the current onion address in the small print inside the image. Reading that string against your URL bar catches most phishing clones at the first step. The check is cheap. Do it every session.